




















SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN PEMALANG, CENTRAL JAVA, 1945*
Anton Lucas
The social upheaval which occurred in the kabupat^n (regency of 
Pemalang on the north coast of Central Java during the last three 
months of 1945 was part of a wider unrest which also shook the two 
neighboring kabupatdn of Tegal and Brebes. Generally remembered as 
the Tiga Daerah ( ’’Three Regions” ) A f fa ir , its causes, course, and after- 
math have been the subject of continued speculation and controversy 
ever s i n c e .* 1 This is partly because, as Kahin reminds us, people ’ s 
perceptions of any event change s ign ificantly  over the years according 
to the ’’changed p olitical context, d ifferent ideological clim ate, and 
altered social v a lu e s .” 2 But it is also because the particular events 
themselves have until now never been clearly and coherently depicted. 
The aim of this article  is to analyze the origins of the ’’social revo­
lution” in Pemalang in the Dutch colonial era and the Japanese occupa­
tion, describe the upheaval it s e l f , and analyze its most significant 
c h aracteristics .
Prewar Pemalang
Pemalang, on the western pasisir  (coastal are a ), was a large com­
mercial center in the early sixteenth century, but thereafter gradually 
lost importance to its two neighbors, Tegal to the west and Pekalongan 
to the east. I f  it retains to this day an identity of its own, this 
identity  is nonetheless partly defined by the character of these neigh­
bors. In the colonial period, the priyayi  (bureaucratic upper class) 
of Tegal, claiming direct linear descent from the royal house of Mata-
*It should be stressed at the start that my narrative is mainly based on peo­
ple’s perceptions of prewar life in Pemalang, the Japanese occupation, and the "social 
revolution” as recalled more than a quarter of a century later. Such perceptions 
should not necessarily be taken as fact. Like all firsthand accounts, they are col­
ored by such factors as individual memory, the present status of informants, the 
relationship between author and informants, and the course of (Indonesian) history 
since the events described took place. Yet they are crucial for reconstructing the 
atmosphere of a vanished era.
The author would like to thank Herb Feith and Ben Anderson for their many help­
ful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay.
1The widely differing interpretations of the Tiga Daerah Affair are reflected 
in the various terms used by Indonesians when talking or writing about it; it has 
been called a pembevontakan (revolt) or a penyelewengan (deviation), but usually the 
more neutral words pergevakan (movement), perjuangan (struggle), or peristiwa (affair) 
are used.
2George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1970 [1952]), p. vi.
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ram, actively discouraged marriage alliances with Pekalongan priyayi 
fam ilies , whom they claimed were descendants of an upstart collaborator 
who had helped the Dutch East India Company in Semarang.3 The impact 
of priyayi r ivalries  has been reinforced by dialect differences (the 
speech of Pekalongan youth w ill s t ill  be laughed at in the streets of 
Tegal and vice versa) and deeper economic contrasts . Pekalongan, the 
rich Residency cap ital, has long been a flourishing batik  center and 
is characterized by Tegal people as a peacock which dances decoratively 
but (by implication) does not dare to figh t . Tegal, a much poorer town 
of small heavy industry, is proudly likened to a w ild  bison which can 
only be mounted and ridden by someone who understands its character. 
Pemalang, a rich rice-growing area, is often compared to a sleek perahu 
(small boat) which, i f  the long steering oar snaps, is easily  thrown 
about by the waves ( ,fwatang putung ing a y u n a n "). The people of Pema­
lang themselves say they can sometimes then be influenced by one side 
or the other, by Pekalongan or Tegal. I f ,  however, the oar of the 
Pemalang perahu is steered with a firm hand, as during the Tiga Daerah 
A ffa ir , it w ill  chart its own course. A second proverbial phrase-- 
"ben4§ munggSng tawang,ff the small gong echoes in the heavens--then 
becomes applicable : the voice of l ittle  Pemalang is heard everywhere.
The intrusion of Western capitalism  in the form of the sugarcane 
factories brought many changes along the western p a s is ir . In Pemalang 
these facto ries , mostly established in the latter part of the n in e ­
teenth century, stretched in an unbroken line across the fertile  coas­
tal p lain ; over a distance of 24 kilometers, five such enterprises 
(Sragi, Comal, Comal Baru, Petarukan, Banjardowo, and Sumberharjo) 
took over almost all the available rice la n d .4 5
People recall that the factory adm inistrator, referred to locally  
as the besar pabrik>5 was more powerful in his area than the Resident 
him self. His factory police (agen polisi  pabrik ) had the authority to 
arrest and detain people just like the regular police . Arab and C hi­
nese shopkeepers quickly clustered around the factories , and, providing 
credit to the Javanese at exorbitant interest rates , compounded the 
d islike  with which the factory was regarded .6
3The Tegal priyayi's belief that they are descended directly from Mataram is 
strengthened by the fact that Amangkurat I, escaping from an attack on his Kartasura 
kraton by Trunojoyo, fell sick, died, and was buried at Tegalarum, a few kilometers 
south of Tegal. Suputro, Tegal Dari Masa Ke Masa (Jakarta: Kementerian Pendidikan, 
Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan, Bagian Bahasa, 1969), pp. 42-44.
4The high fertility of this land is demonstrated by Pemalangfs sugar yields, 
consistently among the highest in Java, and paddy production per hectare, also con­
siderably higher than the all-Java/Madura average. See R. W. Franke, ’’The Green 
Revolution in a Javanese Village** (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1973), p. 
63.
5The expression besar pabrik is still common in villages. Although grammati­
cally incorrect, the (mistaken) usage is referred to by Javanese as "salah kaprah 
bener ora lumrah” or **the mistaken (word) is used/understood by everyone, the correct 
one [in this case pembesar not besar] is not generally used.*’
6The Arabs, addressed as ndoro tuan (your honor) even by the village officials, 
sold tasb£h (Muslim rosaries) and perfumes, but were mainly renowned as usurers, as 
the still-common local phrase ”koyo Arab dadi. tukang renten [becoming a money lender 
like an Arab]” indicates.
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For Dutch-educated Javanese, it was the racial discrim ination 
practiced by the whites and the attitudes of the Indo-Europeans working 
at the factory which were most resented. The former was symbolized by 
the hallowed b illiard s  room where no Javanese could go unless he was 
an entertainer; the latter by the Eurasians' insistence on being spoken 
to in high Javanese, even by Javanese associates with excellent Dutch.
During the final two decades of colonial rule , landlessness had 
become widespread and peasant impoverishment general. One important 
development was the growth of banditry. These bandits, known collec ­
tively  as lenggaong (also as pencoleng [thieves], pentolan  [gang lead­
ers], or blantongan) flourished above all near facto ries , and p articu ­
larly  in the Comal area where the Dutch gave the nickname of anggaok 
to villages where the lenggaong gathered .7 The pangreh praja^ tra d i­
tional Javanese c iv il  adm inistrators, considered appointments to the 
keoamatan (subdistricts) near the factories to be d iffic u lt  postings, 
for prostitution , gambling, and drinking c i u 9 made from waste sugar, 
as well as banditry , were common pastimes.
In Comal, encircled by four cane factories (Sragi, the two in 
Comal, and Petarukan), farmers seldom planted r ic e , as almost all sawah 
(wet rice land) was under sugar. "The farmers were like water b u ffa ­
loes, working day and night, but could scarcely get enough to e a t ,"  a 
nationalist leader recalls . Almost no one was well enough off to have 
a house made of brick , and most homes had thatched grass roofs. V i l ­
lagers had been suffering from p a ^ k  (yaws or framboesia) for so long 
that it had become a popular local b e lie f  around Comal that one ought 
to contract it before one died.
In 1934, the deep popular unrest was expressed in an incident 
which is s t ill  v ivid  in the memory of local people. A Surodadi v i l ­
lager smeared buffalo  dung on the lights of a sugarcane factory vehicle 
which had broken down, and then tied it to a tree with v ines . The man 
who had done this was arrested and tried  on the charge of insulting 
authority. But the accused firmly denied any such intent--understand­
ably, perhaps, since conviction would have meant a ja il  sentence. He 
insisted  that he had been worried that the car would "run away and co l­
lide with someone," and so he shut its "eyes" which were bothering his 
children "so it wouldn't be able to see where it was g o in g ." He had 
used dung because there was no other damp, sticky material immediately 
available . In the end, he was acquitted, but only because he "con ­
fessed" to never having seen a car before or known what it was l i k e .8
7Anggaok and lenggaong mean the same thing, both deriving from the root word 
gaok. In Pemalang gaok means a crow (cf. buvung gagak in Indonesian), i .e .,  a car­
rion-eater, reflecting the Dutch opinion and one local view that these bandits were 
essentially predators on the population.
8Those who related this story to me were always former members of the SR, the 
Sarekat Rakyat (People's Unions, organizations set up in the early 1920s for non­
proletarian members of the Indonesian Communist Party), many of whom lived in and 
around Surodadi village. The SR had a large following in the kabupatSn, especially 
among primary school teachers. After the 1926 communist revolt, at least five SR 
members from the area were imprisoned in Pamekasan (Madura) along with local members 
of the VSTP, the Indonesian railwaym n's union. At least one of the latter, the 
leader in Comal, was even exiled to the Boven.Digul camp in New Guinea.
Rumah Shidokan Pemalang
Kabupaten Pemalang
These sketches are from a collection of drawings made by Soewignjo, the AMRI 
Slawi leader.
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No less than on the coast, the southern h ill  areas of the kabu- 
patdn were marked by exploitation , popular resentment, and social d i s ­
organization . In the subdistrict of Belik , Arab traders controlled 
much of the arable land through their Javanese w iv e s .9 The situation 
had become so bad that Dutch o ffic ia ls  though it necessary to conduct 
a survey in one village  of the subdistrict, Bulakan, to find out how 
much land was owned ille g a lly . A nutrition  survey in the subdistricts 
of Pulosari and Belik showed that extreme m alnutrition was w idesp read .10 
In addition , rat plagues were common, land was in e ffic ien tly  cultivated 
by comparison to other areas, and the cassava crop was regularly 
spoiled or ruined by wild pigs.
In the town of Pemalang it s e lf , there seems to have been a growing 
sense of class cleavage, cutting across aliran  (cultural community) 
lines between the wong duwur (high-class p e o p le ), mainly government 
o ffic ia ls  and rich santri  involved in the Muhammadiyah, and the lower- 
class remainder. Characteristic in this regard was the tension between 
the Muhammadiyah santri, physically  concentrated with the priyayi in 
the residential kampung of Sirandu, and the so-called santri rakyat 
(poor santri) of Pelutan kampung, many of whom joined a cooperative 
led by Haji Zaini and Haji Sachroni. But the Sirandu santri, typified  
by Muhammadiyah leader Abdul Mutholib, his brother, who ran the Hizbul 
Wathan (Muhammadiyah scouts), and nMeneerM Umar, head of Muhammadiyah’ s 
Particulir  Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (Private Dutch-language [pri­
mary] School for Indonesians), were hated not only by the santri rakyat 
of Pelutan, but also by the entire Pemalang pergerakan (national move­
ment) as part of an e lite  that spoke only Dutch among themselves, lived 
in brick houses, played tennis with o ffic ia ls  in the town square, and 
celebrated birthdays with Western-style parties .
Po litical l i fe  in Pemalang in the last years before the war was 
only to a limited degree capable of expressing popular feeling  or solv ­
ing the social problems it faced. Pemalangfs Partindo (Partai Indone­
s ia , Indonesia Party) leaders set up a branch of the PPKP (Persatuan 
Pengusaha Kaum Penganggur, the Association of Unemployed Businessmen) 
which tried  to help small entrepreneurs out of work. A branch of the 
Pomer (Perhimpunan Organisasi Memajukan Ekonomi Rakyat, Association of 
Organizations for the Advancement of the People ’ s W e lfare ), a coopera­
tive set up by Mr. Santosa, a prominent "cooperating" nationalist 
leader in Batavia, was also e sta b lis h e d .11 Many lurah had shares in
9Under the Agrarian Law of 1870, only "natives" could own arable land.
i°Poelosari-Rapport. Onderzoek naar de voeding en voedings toestand der be- 
volking in zuid-Pemalang in 1939-41, Mededeeling No. 6 (Batavia: Instituut voor 
Volksvoeding, November 1941). I am grateful to Michael Williams for drawing my 
attention to this report. One response to these conditions was that in 1940 some 
priyayi officials and lurah (village heads) formed a kebatinan (mystical) group,
Mardi Utomo, which became active in the areas of health, sports, handicrafts, agri­
culture, and the arts. Its program included planting bamboo and tea to stop erosion, 
building lavatories in villages, and obtaining medicine from the government to combat 
the plague. It also distributed brown rice and Chinese peas to those with hunger 
oedema.
11"Co" (Cooperating) and "Non-Co" (Non-Cooperating) were terms widely used
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this consumersT cooperative, which was run by Sarino Mangunpranoto, 
then head of the local Taman Siswa. Sarino was, in fact , the most in ­
fluential p olitica l figure in Pemalang at that time. Though he was 
not an o ffic ia l  member of P a rtin d o ,12 he encouraged the party, as well 
as Pomer and PPKP, to hold their meetings in the Taman Siswa buildings . 
He was also an adviser to the Pelutan cooperative and ran the KBI 
(Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, Indonesian Scouts), composed mainly of 
Taman Siswa stu d e n ts .13
Because of his close personal ties with Dutch o ffic ia ls  (the Con- 
troleur and his w ife were active in the KBI, and the Assistant Resident 
and his wife were theosophists and admirers of Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, 
the founder of Taman S isw a), and the police , Pemalangfs Mmoderate 
na tio n a lists1* were not harassed. Taman Siswa was never reprimanded 
for not flying  the red, white, and blue Dutch flag  on August 31 (Queen 
Wilhelmina*s b irthday ), nor were any of its teachers dismissed under 
the TfWild School** Ordinance of 1933.
The radical n a tio n a lists , such as they were, could do litt le  dur­
ing the 1930s. Most of their efforts went into Persi (Persatuan Sopir 
Indonesia, Indonesian Drivers* Union), which was very active organizing 
oplet (small taxi bus) drivers to protect themselves against intim ida­
tion by police and the Moga Bus Company. A few of them grouped to ­
gether in an organization which could do no more than gain spiritual 
strength by meeting regularly in the house of the kabupatSn doctor, 
Muriawan, to discuss the question of Indonesia Merdeka (Independent 
In d o n e s ia ).
The Japanese Occupation
The Japanese entered Pemalang on March 17, 1 94 2 14 15 to find  the town 
recovering from anti-Chinese riots . There are many versions of how the 
berontakan Cina^s actually started. According to one account, rumors 
had spread that the Government pawnshop would be returning all pawned 
goods without charge, and so thousands of villagers  poured into town
among prewar pergerakan leaders. Being "Co** meant being willing to sit in regency 
or provincial assemblies or in the Volksraad, the national parliament. Members of 
the "Co" group liked to found schools, cooperatives, and scout movements. Pomer was 
a typical "Co" organization, headed by a leading official, with government bureau­
crats involved at all levels.
12According to a Taman Siswa rule, heads of branch schools could not join 
political parties, although ordinary teachers could become members.
13The Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah*s PHIS competed fiercely for pupils, with 
the Sirandu PHIS teachers feeling superior to their Taman Siswa rivals. The Hizbul 
Wathan would have nothing to do with the KBI, on the grounds that they berbau Hindu 
Budha (were influenced by Hindu Buddhist practices).
1ifFrom the diary of Salim Bassiyul, an Arab trader living in Pemalang at the
time.
15Again a localized term, berontakan Cina is another example of "salah kaprah 
bener ora lumrah" (see footnote 5). While grammatically it has to mean "revolt of 
the Chinese,** in Pemalang the phrase (often pronounced brotaan Cina) refers specifi­
cally to the anti-Chinese riots of March 1942..
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with receipts to claim their goods. On finding the shop guarded, the 
crowd began chanting MPadi dibagi! Padi dibagi! [Distribute the r ic e !] "  
and headed off to the town’ s three rice m ills which were ransacked and 
had their machinery taken. As many as fifteen  people were reported 
killed  when a large paddy stack collapsed. F inally , the crowd turned on 
the Chinese shops and pillaged over a hundred of them. The wedana 
(d istrict  head) of Pemalang and the police fired  shots into the air 
but without e ffect . The loot (including iron safes weighing 300 k i lo ­
grams) was carried back to the v illag es .
The most important impact of the Japanese on Pemalang derived from 
their desire to extract as much rice out of the peasantry as possible 
in order to fuel the war effort . Before the war, the Dutch had set up 
a rice procurement agency which provided credit for the Chinese to buy 
rice , which was then stockpiled. People voluntarily  brought their padi 
(unhusked rice) to the Chinese m ills for sale . There was thus no d i ­
rect or obvious government control. And Dutch laws prevented anyone 
from stockpiling more than a ton of rice without permission. Under 
the Japanese, the system changed d rastically . F irst , peasants were 
compelled to make set deliveries of their rice to the state. Second, 
once these deliveries were made, a person could stockpile as much 
hulled rice as space allowed. Third, whereas under the Dutch the pang- 
r§h praja were merely tax collectors, now they had both to supervise 
compulsory rice deliveries and be responsible for organizing the r a ­
tioning of cloth and all basic raw materials from the subdistrict level 
down. The most onerous part of this was that they had paddy quotas to 
f i l l  and were held responsible if  they were not met. As one eamat 
(subdistrict head) put it : "The Japanese would come around every few
days to see us. We were their pengawas ekonomi [economic insp ecto rs]."
The new system involved major changes for the peasant farmer in 
disposal of his crop. It also gave a new role to the village  heads, 
who became the lynchpins in a giant extractive process and thereby 
found new opportunities to swindle farmers. Corruption was so w ide­
spread at all levels that an old word, tanggem (meaning literally  "a  
v ice " or instrument with two jaws between which things may be gripped), 
was now used to refer to large-scale corruption, particularly  by the 
camat.
The major change in the marketing of rice at the village  level 
was that people could no longer take their harvested paddy home from 
the fields  to hull it themselves. They now had to take it to the kalu- 
rahan (v illage  head ’ s house). In the subdistrict of Ulujami on the 
northeastern border of Pemalang, it was said that the v illage  heads 
could cheat villagers  in four new ways. F irst , when a farmer brought 
in his paddy, a standard weight deduction (called repaksi ) of about 
25 percent was made to allow for moisture content. If  the lurah de­
cided that a farm er’ s paddy had a moisture content much higher than 
th is , he simply would not accept it . When he did accept it , he would 
s t ill  always try to overestimate the repaksi to be able to sell the 
extra paddy on the black m arket.16
16By setting a standard 25 percent repaksi3 the lurah consistently overesti­
mated the moisture content (and thus weight deduction), which was actually nearer 23 
percent. Thus he could subtract an average of three kilograms of unhusked rice for 
every quintal delivered. For a typical harvest in Ambowetan of about 2,880 quintals,
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Second, the lurah could obtain the jejeran gabah (fa lle n  unhusked 
rice) from sheaves waiting to be weighed in front of his o ffic e . This 
was especially  lucrative if  the variety grown was padi cempoy which 
falls  more easily  out of the sheaves than does padi jowo. For every 
quintal delivered , the lurah could collect one kilogram of fallen  
gabah. 17
Third, the lurah could avoid paying his quota of rice from the 
village  sawah he t ille d  in lieu  of salary (tanah b£ngkok), land which 
was actually included in the bureaucracy's calculations for the overall 
v illage  quota. He could do this by claiming that because there had 
been a "crop fa ilu r e "  he could only supply his superiors w ith , e .g . ,
80 percent of the v illage  quota. The lowered quota was then f i l le d  
with the v illa g e r s ' paddy, and the lurah could sell his own crop on 
the black m arket .18
Lastly , the scales were manipulated. Those used for weighing the 
paddy at the kalurahan were the colonial government's old iron daoin 
scales, which could weigh a maximum of 60 kilograms at a time. *As it 
was necessary to make two weighings for every q uintal, cheating was 
all the easier , and by underweighing the lurah could gain a kilogram 
or two from every quintal he weighed.
Because of these harsh conditions, more than half the farmers were 
forced to "s t e a l "  their own rice , usually by harvesting it secretly at 
night. The paddy was then buried or hidden in roof rafters . In so 
doing the farmers ran the dire risk  of being found out by the village  
police and reported to the lurah or the kenpeitai  (the dreaded Japanese 
m ilitary  p o l ic e ) . Searches for paddy by village  police took place more 
or less every few months, with some variation depending on the subdis­
trict . 19
In some places, evasion was fa irly  successful, at least when com­
pared to o ff ic ia l  demand. For example, while the camat of Ulujami had 
ordered that only one quintal of paddy could be kept by a farmer from 
every bau harvested--about 4 percent of the average yield  from good
for example, about half of which was delivered to him, the lurah could lift about 43 
quintals per harvest. It is important to note that in Pemalang the weight deduction 
process took place at the kalurahan, not at a separate collection center. Compare 
the description of the lurah's role as middleman in the general account of this prac­
tice in Pekalongan Residency given in Benedict Anderson, "The Problem of Rice," 
Indonesia, 2 (October 1966), p. 95.
17About half the Ambowetan harvest was padi cempo. From the gabah shaken out 
of the total amount of paddy delivered in one harvest he could collect a total of 14 
quintals.
18In Ambowetan the lurah received 12 bau (0.7 hectare) of tanah b&ngkok with 
an average yield of 25 quintals per bau. With a local blackmarket price of f. 6.00 
per kilogram (twice the Jakarta blackmarket price), compared to the official price 
of 10 cents per kilogram, it is clear why profiteering in rice by officials was so 
widespread.
19In the Comal area people believed that the Japanese had secret telephones 
and a special compass which showed where paddy was being hidden.
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land--in practice only half was delivered to the kalurahan. The rest 
was used by the farmer himself or sold on the black m arket.20
From the kalurahan the paddy was either sent to the rice mill 
d irectly , or to the noji padi who sometimes helped the mill by hulling 
the rice on the s p o t .21 The latter was the system used in the Ulujami 
subdistrict . The paddy was sent to the village  of Ambowetan where 
another estimate, this time of the ratio of paddy to hulled rice 
(beras), was made. As there were no standard weight conversion ratios 
set down, the noji padi could cheat by understating the amount of beras 
obtained from hulling a quintal of paddy. If  queried by the camat, the 
noji padi could reply that the amount of beras was less than normal; 
the paddy, he would claim, was gabug (the heads were empty), either 
because of some disease or because, as a result of being picked too 
young, it had had to be made into menir (broken r i c e ) .22 On these 
opportunities for cheating, the former noji padi of Ulujami recalls :
I had to provide the camat of Ulujami with two quintals for his 
family every month. I only hulled the rice to help the rice mill 
and got a wage of Rp. 10 per month. I also took a small amount 
illegally [Msaya juga tanggem kecil2an"]--about four kilograms from 
any one hulling for my family--but I never sold any to the middle­
man, as my assistants would have known; what the noji padi could do 
depended on tahu sama tahu [having an understanding] with his assis­
tants .23
While the camat could not benefit directly  from illeg al dealings 
in rice (except by taking from what was found in searches), he was d i ­
rectly involved in the rationing system. Throughout the Residency of 
Pekalongan the deliveries of rice were tied to cloth rationing . For 
every quintal delivered , a farmer was entitled  to receive a ration of 
one standard-sized piece of cloth, three meters in length. In some 
areas, even the quality of cloth depended on the amount delivered.
From a list  made up at the v illage  office  of the amount of paddy de­
livered , the subdistrict office  issued coupons to the lurah. When the 
cloth arrived at the subdistrict o ffic e , the oarik  (v illage  secretary) 
was summoned to collect what cloth rations were available . There were 
no checks on the camat to ensure that he really  distributed  all the 
rations he received from the kabupatSn. But the camat was not alone 
in being able to exploit the system; the lurah was also well-placed to 
do so, by manipulating the rice-cloth exchange as follows: I f ,  for
example, a farmer delivered less than a quintal of paddy, he did not 
qualify  for any cloth at a ll ; sim ilarly , i f  his quota was, say, lh 
quintals , he would only get one standard-sized piece of cloth. In
20That farmers "stole" their own rice to sell is not surprising, considering 
that peasants in the Pekalongan Residency were getting only f. 1.88 of the f. 4.00 
official price for each quintal. Anderson, "The Problem of Rice," p. 94.
21The noji padi was the local official responsible for paddy collection. Noji 
in Japanese means agricultural affairs and noji iin are agricultural officials.
22The pounders (fifty were employed by the noji padi in Ambowetan), apart from 
getting a wage of one kilogram per quintal pounded, also kept the rice straw, the 
bran, and the broken grains.
23Interview with former noji in November 1975.
96
short, there were no fractions of quotas permitted. The lurah then 
used the extra fractions of rice to collect more cloth at the kecamatan 
level and kept it for him self. An o ffic ia l  appointed by the Japanese 
to oversee the rationing system and paddy collection  at the kabupat^n 
level recalls the situation in some d istricts  thus:
I saw clothing material stacked undistributed in the three kewadanaan 
pendopo [pavilions] of Comal, Randudongkal, and Pemalang, which were 
full of cloth. In Randudongkal, where^my brother-in-law was wedana,
I saw his mattresses were stuffed with clothing material instead of 
kapok; his pillows were also full of yarn.2**
The lurah also supervised the consumer cooperatives, or kumiai, 
and was often Mtahu sama tahu" with the cooperative head (nogyo kumiai) .  
If  there was not enough cloth to go around, the lurah was not likely  
to admit it . Cloth and other supplies were distributed  by the nogyo 
kumiai through the azacho ,2  ^ each azacho being responsible for three 
tonari gumi (neighborhood asso c iat io n s ), which usually corresponded to 
a hamlet. Delivery of supplies was quite irregular, and it was never 
known when they would arrive , let alone in what quantities . Actual 
quotas were decided on the spot by each azacho and kumicho (head of 
the tonari gumi) depending on what was received. Given the nature of 
the system, the widespread shortages, and high black market p rices , it 
it not surprising that corruption was widespread.
Corrupt or not, o ffic ia ls  found their position  as the executors 
of Japanese exactions increasingly d iffic u lt  and even dangerous.
Towards the middle of 1943, Raden Bambang Basiroen, the over-zealous 
camat of Ampelgading, was himself entering houses and climbing roof 
rafters to look for hidden paddy. On a Friday kliwon in that year, 
according to one eyewitness account, a crowd of thousands gathered in 
front of his o ffic e , shouting in Japanese: f,Atsumare! Atsumare!
[Gather! A ssem b le !] ." Not long afterwards, Basiroen was mobbed and 
k illed  with bamboo sp e ars .* 256
In another incident, the carik of Pamutih (Ulujami subdistrict) 
tried to reason with the subdistrict police o fficer  (mantri p o l i s i ) 
and his assistant to prevent them from confiscating ten sheaves of 
rice from a poor farmer who had been saving them for a slametan (ritual 
m e a l ) .27 In his words:
The mantri took my pleas for the poor farmer the wrong way. He 
thought I was hampering him [Mdianggap saya rintangi"]. He then 
confiscated about ten quintals of my paddy as well, leaving only two 
quintals. I had in fact delivered my quota of 15 quintals and I had 
a receipt to prove it. Here I was being told to sell the rest of my 
paddy! Just because I had defended a poor farmer! I protested and 
an argument broke out which ended in a fight. The mantri left, but
2**Interview in February 1975.
25Azaohd from aza meaning hamlet, and ohd, head.
26Transcript of taped interview with a former Ampelgading Seinendan (Youth 
Corps) leader in November 1975.
270ne sheaf of unhusked paddy is equal to about 6 kilograms of hulled rice in 
this area.
97
later in the day a jeep arrived with a kenpeitai officer (a Japa­
nese), and I was taken to the kenpeitai headquarters in Pekalongan.
I was accused of hampering the collection of paddy and kept there 
for seven days. While I was there, I was beaten with a rubber whip, 
given electric shocks through my right hand until I fainted, and 
made to lie on zinc roofing in the midday sun. I was covered with a 
board, and people stood on top of me until I fainted. For seven 
days I was given only a glass of milk three times a day and nothing 
else to eat. At the end of seven days I was sent home.28
No social group in Pemalang society, not even the priyayi o f f i ­
c ia ls , was immune to Japanese violence. Raden Soewignyo Sudarsono, 
the d istrict  secretary, had his face pierced with the sharp point of 
his desk nameplate while working in the General A ffairs  section of the 
Residency o ffic e . A school teacher called Soewignyo, arrested after 
the kenpeitai had received an anonymous letter about him, was tortured 
to death in a Pekalongan j a i l .  During the first  six months of the 
occupation, when the d istrict was under direct m ilitary  administration 
people were often manhandled on the street, as in the following in c i ­
dent :
I was walking past the guardpost in front of the local Japanese com­
mander^ house in the subdistrict of Pulosari, on my way to see a 
friend. I didn’t keirei [Japanese bow, low from the waist], I was 
called up and slapped across the face [ditempet&ng] . The guard asked 
who I was, and I replied that I was a sensei [Japanese for teacher].
He was rather abashed to hear this and said that as a teacher I had 
to set a good example. He was only a krooo [ordinary soldier].29
V illage  people bringing their produce to Pemalangfs market often did 
not understand the rule that one had to keirei at m ilitary  guardposts. 
They were called back, told to get off their b icycles , and hit on the 
head .
Yet although Japanese violence spared no social group, it is im­
portant to remember that in general the lot of v illagers  was far worse 
than that of townspeople. They did not qualify  for rice rations as 
did government o ffic ia ls  or other townspeople.30 In the towns, people 
could s t ill  get cloth, whereas gunny sacking and sarongs of rubber 
were generally worn in rural areas towards the end of the occupation. 
The sacking was full of l ic e , and the rubber hot, sticky , and easily  
torn. Cloth was so scarce that even headscarves were made into shorts 
The towns s t ill  had e lectric ity , schools, and cars; and a majority of 
the Western-educated elite  of the d istrict  lived there. It was this 
group whose support the Japanese considered important, while the word 
genjumin , meaning "n a t iv e ,"  conjured up their view of villagers as 
people who did not really  matter.
28Interview in November 1975. 29Interview in December 1974.
3°According to one official, government officials in Pemalang got 200 grams of 
rice per person per day. Ordinary townspeople received much less, about a kilogram 
per person per month, or 30 grams per person per day, distributed by the kumichd. 
This was not as low as in other parts of Java. See Anderson, "The Problem of Rice,1’ 
p. 91.
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Conditions in the villages during the second half of the occupa­
tion were so bad that many people were forced to eat walur, the root 
of a kind of nettle, which had to be sliced and soaked in brine to r e ­
move the poisonous sap. They also ate cassava, bongol (banana root 
nodules), and boiled bulung leaves, normally used for roof thatching. 
(The Japanese tried  to make a virtue of necessity by encouraging the 
spread of new recipes using these unaccustomed ingredients .) In Pema- 
lang, bubur perjuangan (peoplefs struggle porridge) seems to have con­
sisted of sweet potato, cassava, and katul . 31 " I t  was like eating 
chicken f e e d ,"  recalls a nationalist leader, " I  wanted to vom it."
Fuel was also in short supply. What kerosene there was, was too 
thick to burn in lamps. Instead, people used homemade wicks in a 
saucer of the kerosene o il , a process which f i l le d  the house with soot 
"You could rub your nose and soot would come o f f , "  they say. There 
were no matches or cigarette-lighter f l in ts ; instead, various coconut 
tree fibers which would burn for hours were used.
Some attempts were made both by honest priyayi o ffic ia ls  and 
leaders of the prewar nationalist movement to alleviate  the shortages 
in the rural areas by forming cooperatives. One of these was Kopi 
(Koperasi Indonesia ), founded by Sarino Mangunpranoto and based on the 
prewar Pomer. It included the town’ s top priyayi o f f ic ia ls , with the 
d istrict  head (bupati ) as patron, the public prosecutor as honorary 
head, and Abdul Mutholib, the head of Muhammadiyah, as business mana­
ger. Using the authority of the bupati, Sarino was able to raise 
enough capital from selling  shares in Kopi to various lurah to buy 
supplies of soap, sugar, cloth, and cooking o il . These were d is t r ib ­
uted to each lurah according to local needs. Kopi worked smoothly 
until 1943, when Sarino moved to Pati; after that, it declined, as 
Mutholib gradually gained the reputation of being Pemalang’ s biggest 
sw indler .
Kopi’ s main competitor was the Pekope (Penolong Korban Perang,
War V ictim s1 H elpers), a cooperative set up by "non-Co" members of the 
prewar nationalist movement. Led by Soepangat, Pemalang’ s senior medi 
cal orderly, the organ ization ’ s membership included two santri leaders 
H. Sanusi from Pelutan and H. Zaini from Randudongkal. Pekope also 
ran the Fuji restaurant, which was a favorite meeting-place for santri 
and nationalist leaders a like . Comments one prominent santri from 
near Pemalang: " I  have never eaten sat! like i t , the spices were un­
r iv a le d ."  The Fuji also housed the Pemalang headquarters of the PKI 
underground that was based in the inland forestry plantations. It was 
used as an overnight stopping place for leaders of this underground, 
including W idarta, Seto, Kam idjaja, and C il ik , all of whom had escaped 
kenpeitai sweeps in Jakarta, Solo, and East Java.
By the end of the occupation, the radical nationalists came into 
effective  leadership of the nationalist movement in Pemalang. With 
the departure of Sarino, a moderating and unifying influence exerted 
through the Taman Siswa was gone; the subsequent discrediting  of Kopi, 
because of the corrupt activ ities  of Mutholib and his priyayi asso­
ciates, accelerated the process. By contrast, Soepangat, with his 
reputation for honesty, became increasingly in fluential as leader of
3'iKatul is the brown skin of unpolished'rice, rich in vitamin Bl.
99
the Pekope.32 Through Pekope too, Amir, a prewar PKI leader from 
Comal, became well known to the pemuda and the town's nationalist move­
ment .
Responses to the Proclamation
The revolusi sosial  (social revolution) in Pemalang must be seen 
in the context of national and residency politics  of the time. The i n i ­
tial excitement caused by the Proclamation of Independence was f o l ­
lowed by a month of consolidation by the nationalist leaders in Jakarta , 
who anticipated the rapid arrival of the A l l ie s . One aim of the first  
Indonesian Republican cabinet, which lasted from September 4 until 
November 14 , was to show the British  (who had arrived in various parts 
of Java by the end of October) and the rest of the world that the gov­
ernment had real authority over the population and commanded genuine 
popular support. But this aim was never really  achieved. The elderly 
cabinet was extremely weak and soon collapsed, partly because of the 
revolutionary actions in regions such as Pemalang, which it could not 
control. The much younger Syahrir cabinet, which replaced it , was 
just as concerned to show the A llies  that, through transforming the 
KNIP (KomitS Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National Com­
mittee) from an advisory into a parliamentary leg islative  body and 
allowing the establishment of political parties , Indonesia had a demo­
cratic form of government. However, the new cabinet was no more suc­
cessful than its predecessor in working out a policy towards the revo­
lutionary actions in the local areas. S ja h r ir 's  Perjuangan Kita (Our 
Struggle ), which was intended to explain the Prime M in ister 's  ideas, 
was hardly heard of outside Jakarta. A complete lack of understanding 
of Syah rir 's  policy towards the A llies  and the pangrdh p raja , and about 
why he seemed to be courting both, separated the pemuda (youthful 
activ ists ) in places like Pemalang from the central government. So the 
revolusi social took its course, as we shall see. And when by Novem­
ber local leaders fin ally  had the situation under control and the gov­
ernment running again with newly chosen o f f ic ia ls , these efforts were 
ignored by Jakarta and the provincial government. If  Sukarno and the 
top pangrSh praja in Jakarta had made a gentlemen's agreement of mutual 
support on September 2, nothing of the sort occurred at the Residency 
l e v e l .33 At this level, a power vacuum quickly developed. Mutual 
suspicion between the Resident, Mr. Besar, and pemuda groups was height­
ened because of his late appointment3  ^ and because of the kenpeitai
32Soepangat, who was born in Banyumas in 1903, had worked in Semarang before 
coming to Pemalang as senior medical orderly in the prewar years. He helped to found 
Pekope at the beginning of the occupation. Subsequent to being imprisoned for more 
than a year in the aftermath of the Tiga Daerah, he became an official in Soepeno's 
Ministry of Youth and Development. He was never a member of any political party 
after the war and died of cholera in December 1958.
33At a speech to the all-Java and Madura conference of the pangrSh praja in 
Jakarta, Sukarno had exhorted the latter to get close to the people, while assuring 
them that in return for their loyalty and support they would be given a "proper place" 
in the new Republic. See B. R. O’G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupa­
tion and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 113-14.
3**Along with the Jakarta municipality, the Residency of Pekalongan was left 
open when all existing Fuku Shuchokan (Vice-Residents) were appointed as Residents
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massacre of pemuda in Pekalongan city on October 3, for which Mr. Besar 
was largely blamed. He proved unable to exercise real authority or 
maintain law and order; the police was disbanding in many areas, and 
the army, for reasons of its own, withdrew its battalions from the 
three kabupatSn. Before he finally  left the Residency on November 12, 
however, Mr. Besar had been persuaded to install Soepangat formally as 
bupati in Pemalang and to ratify  the appointments of many perjuangan 
camat and wedana who had been swept into office  during the revolusi 
sosial of October.
The arrival of Sayuti Melik as Sukarno's personal envoy to talk 
with perjuangan leaders now united in the so-called Badan Perjuangan 
Tiga Daerah (BP3D) achieved nothing, since he was personally unaccept­
able to the prewar communist leaders who now dominated the BP3D. Raden 
Mas Soeprapto, sent by the provincial government to serve as Acting 
Resident, had l it t le  choice but to agree to demands for replacement of 
the remaining pangrSh praja in the Tiga Daerah and ratificatio n  of the 
appointments of all popularly chosen o f f ic ia ls . After accepting the 
appointment of S a rd jijo , the BP3D candidate for Resident, at a meeting 
in Pemalang on December 9 , Soeprapto quickly left  the Residency. A 
belated attempt at mediation by the central government by sending in 
four key members of Prime Minister Syahrir 's  Socialist  Party--namely, 
Soebadio Sastrosatomo and Dr. Sudarsono (then Minister for Social A f ­
fa irs ) to Pekalongan, and Moerad and Djohan Sjahruzah to Pemalang-- 
proved a fiasco .
F inally , on December 11, Sardjijo  was installed  by the social 
revolutionaries as Resident in Pekalongan. After three and a half 
days, however, local army un its , including those that had earlier  been 
withdrawn from the Tiga Daerah, irked by the imprisonment of their 
santri commander in Slawi (south of Tegal) and by the placing of guards 
around the Residency cap ital, joined with certain angry Muslim pemuda 
and swept through the Tiga Daerah, releasing imprisoned pangrdh praja 
and arresting over one thousand people. Six nationalist leaders were 
eventually brought to t r ia l , charged with attempting a coup against 
the government. The charges were eventually dism issed, and all were 
released before the first  Dutch police action of July 1947.
Having b r ie fly  sketched the course of events at the national and 
Residency level, let us now turn to what happened in Pemalang. After 
the Proclamation, a group of moderate nationalist politicians  and o f f i ­
cials  calling  it s e lf  the Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Daerah Pemalang 
(Committee for the Preparation of Independence in the Region of Pema­
lang) began to suggest flying the Merah Putih (Indonesian f l a g ) . Be­
cause this group, which included Abdul Mutholib, was close to the 
town's pangr^h p raja , there was no opposition from the latter--a s it u ­
ation contrasting sharply to what transpired in Brebes, Tegal, and the *
on September 5, 1945. See Koesnodiprodjo (ed.), Himpunan undang-undang, peraturan- 
peraturan, penetapan-penetapan pemerintah Repubtik Indonesia} 1945} rev. ed. (Jakar­
ta: Seno, 1951), p. 88. The reaction to this was a special motion of support from 
the Pekalongan National Committee. Mr. Besar's appointment was finally ratified by 
Jakarta on September 21. Jakarta's hesitation seems to have strengthened suspicions 
about Mr. Besar's Republic credentials among perjuangan leaders and the pemuda 
throughout the Pekalongan Residency.
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Residency capital it s e l f , where priyayi o ffic ia ls  either refused or 
actively  opposed pemuda demands that the Merah Putih be flown in front 
of all government buildings. In Pemalang the Japanese flag by the 
kabupatln was hauled down for good on September 1 0 . 35
A sim ilar group made up the kabupat&n's KNI (Komit§ Nasional Indo­
nesia , Indonesian National Committee). Unlike its counterpart in 
Tegal, where pemuda leaders were strongly represented, the Pemalang 
KNI was dominated by priyayi o f f ic ia ls . The chairman was the patih  
(deputy to the b u p a t i) , with Abdul Mutholib as first  vice-chairman, 
and the wedana of Belik as second vice-chairman. It also included some 
of Pemalang's prominent conservative santri leaders, and several moder­
ate nationalist p o lit ic ian s . The fu ll  group, eight in a l l , seems to 
have been appointed by the bupati, R. T. A . Rahardjo Soeroadikoesoemo, 
rather than chosen by acclamation at pemuda meetings as occurred in 
Tegal. This KNI was never to be more than a paper organization . It 
does not seem ever to have had an o ffic e , and at least two other promi­
nent members of the Pemalang perjuangan say that they either "knew 
nothing of i t , "  or that " i t  d id n 't  e x i s t ."  Abdul Mutholib was appar­
ently the only "a c tiv e " KNI member, making trips into villages  to tell 
the people that "they had to demonstrate social orderliness ["harus 
menunjukkan tertib s o s i a l " ] . " 36
Rather than the KNI, it was four loosely knit pemuda groups that 
sprang up in active response to the dramatic developments in Jakarta 
and the lack of enthusiasm in the Residency cap ital: GPAI (Gerakan
Pemuda Arab Indonesia, Movement of the Arab Youth of Indonesia ); Laskar 
Pemuda Tionghoa (Chinese Youth Ir r e g u la r s ); Hizbullah  (Army of G o d ); 
and API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth G eneration), of 
which the last was by far the largest.
The GPAI was organized exclusively by the town's Arab pemuda.
Its treasurer, a former Persi ac tiv ist , describes its purpose thus:
"We wanted the Arab group to organize it s e l f , to provide its own lead­
ership ; we d id n 't  want to be led by others. We d id n 't  even have any 
connection with H iz b u l la h ."37
This separateness of the Arab community was partly physical; the 
Arabs lived in the so-called kampung Arab and prayed in their own 
mosque, quite apart from both the Muhammadiyah group in Sirandu and 
the santri rakyat of Pelutan. But it was also ideological, for the 
Pemalang Arab community was strongly influenced by the Al-Irsad, the 
most progressive of the prewar Arab educational movements, which ran a 
school and a scout group in Pemalang.
About 30 Chinese youths between the ages of 18 and 22, all edu­
cated at the local Tiong Hoa Hwee Kwan (Chinese-language sc h o o l), were 
organized in the Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa. Like most other badan per­
juangan (resistance organization) leaders in Pemalang, the Laskar
3SSoegriwoPoedjooetomo, "Ikhtisar Perjuangan Politik dari thn. 1940 sampai 
akhir 1949 di Daerah Pemalang Selatan" (typescript) .
36Transcript of taped interview with a former Pemalang perjuangan leader in 
February 1975.
37Interview in February 1975.
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leaders Tan Djing Kwan and Tju Liep Goan had been active before the war 
in Pomer, and Djing Kwan was a close friend of API leader Soepangat.
H izbullah , formed towards the end of the Japanese occupation,, 
coordinated many of the town’ s Muslim pemuda. Like the GPAI and the 
Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa leaders, its leaders, Haji Bushaeri and Nur 
Effendy, had no sympathy with the so-called ’’corrupters, "  the priyayi 
o f f i c ia l s .
It was A PI, however, which coordinated the majority of the town’ s 
pemuda. As we have seen, its leader Soepangat had emerged by the end 
of the occupation as the town’ s leading nationalist figure , backed by 
the santri rakyat of Pelutan, the PKI underground, and most pemuda 
elements. In the period after the Proclamation Soepangat continued to 
be respected and trusted by the pemuda as they organized into the 
groups mentioned above. The only opposition came from the small 
Angkatan Muda (Young Generation), most of whom were sons of the town’ s 
o f f ic ia ls . (In  many ways this conflict actually had its origins back 
in earlier  r ivalries  between the leaders of Kopi and Pekope.)
A P I ’ s organization was divided into four so-called markas (head­
quarters). Markas I ,  in it ia lly  located at Soepangat’ s house, had 
essentially  p olitica l functions. It was composed of many of the prewar 
pergerakan leaders from Partindo and the KBI, as well as an older group 
of former Sarekat Rakyat members who, like Amir, had been imprisoned 
in Boven Digul after the communist uprising of 1926. During the revo- 
lusi sosial of October, Markas I was to move from Soepangat’ s house 
into the Assistant Resident’ s o ffices  on the east side of the town 
square. There, under Am ir’ s tutelage, an asrama (barracks) was started 
and pemuda were given m ilitary training and p o litica l  indoctrination . 
Markas I I ,  located near the morning market, was responsible for secur­
ity of the town in general, and of the market in particular . Markas 
I I I  handled A P I ’ s finances. Like the other badan perjuangan, API 
relied  heavily on contributions from the town’ s business community.
But since in Pemalang this community was dominated by Arabs, Chinese, 
and santri, the GPAI, LPT, and Hizbullah had obvious advantages in 
raising money from this source. Accordingly, Markas I I I  tried to 
raise funds by putting on plays.
These plays, put on by Markas I I I  throughout the period of the 
revolusi sosial until early December 1945, were staged at the Indra 
Picture Theater. The sri panggung (star) was a young girl called 
R iftha , who sang songs of the revolution reminding the youth of their 
resp o n sib ilities . One favorite was Sumpah Pemuda (Oath of Youth), the 
first  line of which ran ’’Sumpah pemuda menjadi kewajibanku [The oath 
of youth is my d u t y ] .” Tickets sold for 25 cents, 50 cents, and one 
rupiah. Three lakon (stories) came to be played in rotation, changing 
every two nights. The first  was Diujung Bambu Runeing (At the Point 
of the Bamboo S p e a r ), about the unity of the pemuda rakyat (youth of 
the common people), whose only weapons were bamboo spears. The second 
was Untung Suropatiy about the career of the famous late seventeenth 
century Balinese hero, who fought against the VOC in Java. The third , 
composed in November, was Didepan Kawat Berduri (In  Front of the Barbed 
Wire) and told the story of the British  assault on Surabaya on Novem­
ber 10. One of the leading actors recalls : ’’These plays were in Java­
nese, written by a certain Sumito, who was steeped in mysticism and 
very clever at composing. The tambur [band] was referred to as the
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jazz band and was very popular. Every night was f u l l . " 38 Aside from 
helping to raise funds, these plays also helped to promote a kind of 
separate pemuda identity . From the plays, young people could learn 
that to be a pemuda meant to be active for the revolution, to wear 
one ’ s hair short, and to have clothes that were sembarangan or any old 
how (such as wearing odd sh o e s ).
Markas IV acted as a kind of social welfare o ffic e . A former 
member of Markas IV remembers:
The pemuda would bring in poor people from the kampung to receive 
a quota of cloth. They had to come in person, as the cloth would 
not be distributed elsewhere by the pemuda. The people who came 
were asked their name and work, and their kampung, and we told 
them that the cloth had to be used by them and was not to be sold.
I had to guard the distribution and no one was dishonest; if two 
meters per person was being given out, then it was exactly two 
meters, no more and no less.39
But in addition to distributing  cloth, Markas IV also attempted to con­
trol all economic activity  within the kabupatSn. The same API member 
continues: "Any goods sent into the kabupatdn capital were detained.
Markas IV was informed and it reported to Markas I . Markas I then de­
cided whether the goods were needed for the perjuangan or not. If  they 
were needed, they were bought at two-thirds their value; there was no 
e x t o r t io n ."* *0 Sim ilarly , goods could not leave the kabupatdn without 
permission from the leader of Markas IV.
One of the pemudafs main tasks was to organize the town security , 
and here too API proved more effective  than the other badan perjuangan. 
As compensation for turning up for guard duty, its pemuda received nasi 
ponggol (rice wrapped in banana leaves) cooked at a public kitchen 
(dapur umum) where many of the activist girls  were assigned. In fact , 
nasi ponggol was no better or worse than everyday food, but it (or the 
workers at the dapur umum) caught the imagination of the pemuda and 
came to be a symbol of the revolusi sosial.**1
As the social revolution developed, several typical characteris­
tics of being a real pemuda emerged. People say one had to join  (ham s  
turut) in turning up at the markas for guard duty. No one ever ordered 
one to do th is ; it was part of the pemuda consciousness to understand 
the need to do guard duty ("jiw a  insyaf terhadap keamanan") . **2 (But 
anyone not active was quickly suspected of being "the enem y.") A 
pemuda was someone with enthusiasm (semangat) ,  and this was more impor­
tant than age, sex, education, or marital status (although few in fact 
were m arried). I f  they had semangat, even people more than f ifty  years 
old or with established status were said to have youthful blood (darah 
pemuda') .
38Interview in February 1975. 39Interview in February 1975. **°Ibid.
**1However, some pemuda were reluctant to relieve their fellows on guard duty 
if the nasi ponggol had not arrived, leading one pemuda leader to refer to them 
cynically as pemuda ponggol.
**2This distinguished the pemuda in Pemalang from the rakyat biasa (common 
people), who weren’t aware of the importance of security.
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On the other hand, one was free (bebas) to come and go when one 
felt  like i t , nothing should be too organized, each person was seeking 
his own freedom (Mmasing-masing mencari kebebasan s e n d i r i " ) . As a 
Hizbullah leader recalls it :
The pemuda wanted freedom [kebebasan] , yet didnft understand, and 
weren’t much concerned with the meaning of independence [kemerde- 
kaan]. They were more concerned with military drill [baris- 
berbaris] and sowing seeds of hate against the Dutch [menanam 
benih ketidaksenangannya terhadap Belanda] . What did the pemuda 
talk about? Only one thing, defending the country [membela ne- 
gara] .43
The use of nicknames (wadanan) referring to physical traits or 
eccentric behavior was common in Pemalang during the social revolution, 
and reflects the links that developed between the pemuda and certain 
radical older pergerakan leaders. Wadanan were originally  used as a 
kind of code between members of the prewar radical underground, p art ic ­
ularly  those in prison, for protection against Dutch spies. Normally 
such epithets used publicly  would cause shame or embarrassment because 
they usually referred to physical flaws. But in the Pemalang per- 
juangan, one had to have the courage to be nicknamed anything ("harus 
berani d iw a d a n i ") . For example, Jono cempluk was so called because he 
was short like a small lamp (cemplik) with a round protruding stomach 
(nyempluk) ;  or the man known as Karso gebog because he was short and 
slightly  plump like the gebog, a small storage place for poor farm ers’ 
paddy; or Amir codot9 the prewar communist leader, who gained his n ick ­
name because his favorite food was bananas, like the codot b ird . The 
fact that the pemuda picked up the wadanan style reflects their trust in 
and admiration for the older r a d ic a ls .44
The special nature of pemuda solidarity  in Pemalang in this period 
can be seen in the membership and role of Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis  
Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth), the name API took after mid- 
November.45 It is striking how those who remember the period today 
emphasize the way in which Pesindo unified  all groups. Aliran  and 
ideology were unimportant in the struggle against the common enemy. The 
ex-head of the information section of Pesindo in Randudongkal recalls :
A big sign, PESINDO, was put up outside the pemuda headquarters in 
Randudongkal. I went once as a delegate to a Pesindo meeting in 
the Agung theater in Pemalang with Kyai Said from Gendoang. But 
we only discussed social, not political problems, e .g ., about 
organizing food for the pemuda and about clothing for the people.46
But pemuda unity was not only a matter of common generalized 
goals. Pemalang Pesindo leaders were also not at all selective about 
whom they approved as leaders of local Pesindo groups. It must have
43Interview with a former Hizbullah leader in December 1975.
44At the time of the social revolution, Soepangat himself was over 40, Amir 
was 38, and the Hizbullah leader Bushaeri was well over 30.
45This followed the formation of Pesindo at the national pemuda congress in 
Yogya on November 12.
46Interview with former Randudongkal Pesindo leader in November 1975.
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been obvious at times that certain people were forming Pesindo branches 
mainly to protect themselves from the revolusi sosial going on around 
them rather than to support it . Thus in the subdistrict of Petarukan, 
a subbranch of Pesindo was set up in Kendalsari, one of the richest 
v illages  in the entire kabupatSn. (In  the Dutch period, when bicycles 
were s t il l  few in number--at most ten in a village--Kendalsari land­
lords already owned c ars .) Its leader was the son of a man who had 
been lurah during the Japanese time, who had three wives, and whose 
family owned 162 bau of rice-land. Pesindo office-holders in Kendal­
sari were all related to one another and all came from landlord fam i­
l ie s . They and the Kendalsari pemuda who joined Pesindo (all of whom 
were Dutch-educated) did so, as one local perjuangan leader put it , 
"simply and solely to save their fam ilies from being disturbed as a 
result of rapid social change [semata-mata untuk menyelamatkan keluarga 
dari gangguan akibat perobahan sosial yang c e p a t ] It is possible 
that the Pemalang Pesindo leaders approved the Kendalsari subbranch 
leadership in the expectation of tapping the v il la g e 's  wealth to help 
other areas. I f  so, these expectations were certainly  frustrated. As 
the ex-secretary of Kendalsari Pesindo (half g u ilt ily ) remembers:
MFive sugarcane railway trucks, then two more, each with a capacity of 
twenty quintals , arrived from the Comal Pesindo with a request for 
paddy. However, our leader refused. In fact he had 150 quintals stored 
away him self, and there must have been hundreds more in the v illag e . " 47 
The fact that nothing happened to the Kendalsari Pesindo leadership 
over this incident reflects how loosely knit Pesindo was and the lack 
of real authority of Pemalang leaders over v illage  branches. The truth 
is that Pemalang leaders simply lacked the trained cadres at the v i l ­
lage level necessary for any sustained, systematic social revolution 
to occur.
Another element in the Pemalang pemuda identity  was the intensity  
of fee lin g ; true pemuda felt things with more intensity  than other 
people. Beginning with the November fighting  in Surabaya, the slogan 
Mit is better to bathe in blood than to be colonized [lebih baik mandi 
darah daripada dijajah\"  became popular, and the word darah (blood) 
became, at least in one rural area, a cry no less important than 
Merdeka. For some, darah meant "one struggle, one h e a r t ,"  the unity 
of the struggle against the Dutch. For others, it meant the blood of 
the colonialists  i f  they dared to come back. It could symbolize the 
daring of young heroes defending their country; it could also forebode 
revenge for the bitterness and suffering of the Japanese p e r io d .48
Having described the main pemuda groups that sprang up in Pemalang 
after the Proclamation and b riefly  discussed their ethos, we may now 
return to the events in Pemalang themselves. One early problem that 
faced the pemuda after the Proclamation was what to do with the local 
Japanese. It is likely  that they were galvanized by the kenpeitai 
massacre of pemuda in Pekalongan on October 3, for they moved quickly 
in the week that followed. A leader of the GPAI who took part in the 
event describes the capture of the town ja i le r , Yamashita, as follows:
47Interview in November 1975.
48The famous Pesindo song Darah Rakyat (Blood of the People) in effect says 
that the rakyat will come to judge their oppressors.
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An attack was planned on the jailer*s house. Some pemuda crept 
forward on their hands and knees, the way they had been taught in 
the Keibddan [Auxiliary Police] and Seinendan training, deathly 
scared that they would be mowed down by machine-gun fire after what 
happened in Pekalongan. But some didn’t understand the danger and 
walked casually toward the house. We found it full of yarn for 
fishing nets!
Yamashita him self turned out to be hiding in the j a i l .  When found by 
the pemuda, he told them he wanted to be disarmed in the correct 
fashion by the p olice . When pemuda called the police , he formally 
handed over his o ffice  and asked to be taken to Tegal.
The other important Japanese was a certain Lieutenant M orishita, 
the trainer (shidokan) of the 120-man strong Dai Ni Chudan (Second Com­
pany) of the Dai Ni Daidan (Second Battalion) of the P e t a ,5 ° stationed 
in the old sugarcane factory of Sumberharjo, several kilometers south 
of Pemalang. Morishita was then living in an old Dutch house on the 
north side of the square. As one member of Markas IV of API tells  the 
story:
When I arrived in front of the shidokan*s house, about twenty or 
thirty people had collected from off the streets, wanting to attack.
I knew the shidokan personally, he had come to me for watch repairs.
We were all afraid that there might be some Japanese fugitives from 
Pekalongan. We found one firearm and a samurai sword. We took the 
shiddkan to the police barracks. I don’t know what happened to him 
after that.51
In the meantime, the pemuda were guarding all the roads going 
south and west, setting up roadblocks made of bullock wagons to hamper 
any Japanese trying to escape Pekalongan for the south. But no Japa­
nese were caug h t .* 5012
I f  dealing with the Japanese was important to the urban pemuda, 
the immediate concern of v illag ers , as news of the Proclamation tr ic k ­
led in , was food. September provided little  r e lie f  from the hunger 
and shortages which people had experienced during the occupation. In 
the southern subdistricts of Pemalang, one former lurah recalls , there 
were over one hundred quintals of paddy delivered after the last har­
vest (May-June) which the Japanese had not been able to u t il ize  before 
the surrender. Demands from hungry villagers that this paddy be
**9Interview in February 1975. The Pemalang GPAI leaders were particularly sen­
sitive about repercussions to the Pekalongan events as one of their members was among 
those who had been killed in the kenpeitai-pemuda clash there.
50Established by the Japanese in 1943, the Peta was an Indonesian-manned and 
-officered self-defense force.
51Interview in Pemalang in February 1975.
52Both the Pekalongan keibitai (city garrison) and the kenpeitai had their re­
gional headquarters in Purwokerto, southwest of Pekalongan. It was thought that any 
Japanese who escaped would naturally head that way. In fact the Japanese in Peka­
longan had already all been disarmed after the Resident of Banyumas, Mr. Iskak Tjokro- 
hadisurjo, had come into town with a Japanese aide and successfully negotiated their 
transfer to Purwokerto.
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distributed went unheeded by village  o f f ic ia ls . The tension this p o l­
icy engendered is nowhere better illustrated  than in the subdistrict 
of Moga. During the first  week in October, a meeting was called there 
while the camat, Singgih Harsojo, was away in Pemalang. The people 
asked that the paddy be distributed but were told that nothing could 
be done until the camat returned. The former secretary of the Moga 
branch of the Badan Pembantu P ra ju rit53 recalls that:
A large crowd had gathered in front of the noji storehouse demanding 
the distribution of the paddy. The Fuku Sonch5 [assistant camat],
Deradjat [younger brother of the bupati of Pemalang], got up to speak 
to the crowd. He was very scared. He said in Javanese, "Sedulur, 
sedulur emut! [Brothers! Brothers! Be aware!] ."  The crowd got angry 
and began throwing big rocks, which missed the assistant camat but 
fell on the tiled roof which was soon full of holes, though the walls 
were undamaged. The rocks also hit the tin roof of the shelter in 
front of the storehouse, then bounced off and rolled down the hill, 
making a terrific noise. The assistant camat fled—perhaps because 
of the noise. I told the crowd, "We canft give out the paddy yet!"
A voice from the middle of the crowd said, "You*re all women here.
You can be beaten by just one man!" I moved into the crowd to find 
out who had said that. It was someone from Jatinegara who had mar­
ried and settled in Moga--he ran away. By twelve midnight the sound 
of the kentongan [wooden signal-drum] was far away.5**
The next morning, the camat returned and held a meeting to hear 
reports of what happened. The local teacher Darmowarsito, a Catholic 
from Magelang, suggested that the camat "arrest the troublem akers."
But the camat preferred to begin a campaign to calm the v illag es :
I was sent by the camat with the lurah of Moga, Haji Mawardi, to 
villages to give information to the people. The lurah were becoming 
scared because people were turning up at the kalurahan with sharp­
ened bamboo spears. We sent to Sima village. I said to them, "Be 
calm, the government will arrange things. Don't take action on your 
own."55
As events were to show over the next two weeks, the government 
had no time to lose in which "to arrange t h in g s ."  By the end of the 
second week in October it was too late to distribute the surplus paddy. 
The revolusi sosial had begun.
53The Badan Pembantu Prajurit (Servicemen's Aid Organization) had been set up 
by the Japanese to help families of those men recruited into the Peta and Heihd 
(auxiliary forces attached to the Japanese Army). In Pemalang the BP2 also provided 
extra food rations and entertainment for the Peta Dai Ni Chudan.
5**This meant that by midnight the disturbances around Moga had died down, and 
the kentongan signal for emergencies or danger was by then being sounded in villages 
some distance away. Interviews in November 1975. Jatinegara is a neighboring keca- 
matan across the border in the kabupaten of Tegal.
55Interview, November 1975.
The Revolusi Sosial
The social revolution or rakyat bevgevak (peoplefs action) period, 
as it is referred to in Pemalang, began over demands that paddy be d is ­
tributed. By early October these demands had s t ill  not been met.
On the night of October 7, a large crowd surrounded the house of 
Raden Mas Hardjowijono, the lurah of Cerih, a village  to the southwest 
just across the Tegal border in the subdistrict of Jatinegara. The 
lurah, his w ife, and 15-year-old son had locked themselves inside , and 
at 1 a.m . the crowd threatened to burn the house down i f  the lurah did 
not come out. Later that morning, October 8 , Hardjowijono finally  
dressed himself in his fu ll lurah1s uniform, faced the crowd, and 
asked what he had done wrong. He was disarmed and dressed in sacking, 
while his w ife was made to wear a necklace of paddy. Then both were 
paraded, to the accompaniment of his own gamelan orchestra, the whole 
five kilometers to Jatinegara. There they were further humiliated by 
being made to drink unboiled water from half a coconut shell and to 
eat rice b r a n .56 Then the lurah and his family were imprisoned in the 
kecamatan office  so that the local perjuangan leaders, including a new 
camat, could keep an eye on them.
Two days later , in Warungpring, across the border in Pemalang, 
the house and store of a Chinese trader, Oei Tjun Lum, was burned to 
the ground. When news of this incident reached Moga, the subdistrict 
capital, Moga's only bus was chartered by local o ffic ia ls  to go to i n ­
spect the damage. The next day, Thursday, October 11, 1945, was market 
day. Early in the morning a crowd arrived in Moga parading a person 
with corn cobs and young jackfruit around his neck. As it was market 
day and many people were coming into the town, the crowd gathered in 
strength as it proceeded. Kyai Said from Gendoang, the leader of the 
group, was carrying the heirloom (pusaka) of Mandirejo, a kris called 
Kyai P o k a l ,57 sheltered by an umbrella. When they entered the yard of 
the subdistrict o ffic e , the camat, Singgih Harsojo, came out and asked 
what they wanted. nThis man was stealing corn [Wong si nyolongi 
jagung] , "  they said . The camat stepped forward and said , "Why have 
you brought him here like this? You should have handed him over to 
the lu r a h ."  At that point, the crowd surged forward and someone struck 
the camat in the face with an axe. He ran for the telephone outside 
the o ffic e , but it was pushed off the table and fell  to the ground. 
While running away from the kecamatan, covered with blood, he was hit 
by a stone and fe ll  in the mud, but finally  managed to pick himself up 
and get aw ay.58 As Singgih Harsojo told it 30 years later:
Someone hid me behind a rice mortar. After I had been lying there 
for a couple of hours, a neighbor came and smuggled me into a nearby 
rice barn. I slept for a time and then must have passed out alto­
gether until about 6 a.m. the next morning. Then I crept out and
56Interview with the son of the former lurah of Cerih in February 1975.
57Candi Mandirejo was a sacred grave in Moga. People who had Mandirejo blood 
were supposed never to work for the Dutch; and there was a belief that if any pan- 
greh praja saw Kyai Pokal he would be dismissed from his job.
58This account was given my informant (who had left Moga earlier in the day) 
by a Chinese shopkeeper who was there at the time. It is not an eyewitness account.
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walked along the road towards Pemalang, but after a while I fainted 
again. Luckily, someone took me to the local hospital and later to 
Pemalang.59
It was widely believed that Kyai Said had used the clever decep­
tion of bringing a thief "caught in the act" to lure the camat out to 
meet the crowd. The necklaces made of the "sto len  goods" were a par­
ticularly  effective  element in the ruse. The rest of market day in 
Moga saw the ransacking of the houses of eleven people who were promi­
nently involved in the distribution  system during the Japanese occupa­
tion.
Kyai S a id ’ s action in parading his "t h ie f "  up to the subdistrict 
o ffice  set a pattern which was to be repeated against many lurah all 
over Pemalang in the next two weeks. But in every other case the 
thief was a "r e a l "  one. Such actions went under the name dombr^ng.
The word dombrdng comes from tong and br£ng3 two onomatopaeic Javanese 
words for the sounds of banging on wood or metal. Thus to be dombrSng-ed 
during October 1945 in Pemalang and Tegal meant to be paraded around 
to the accompaniment of clanging tin  pots and wooden clappers. "Tong, 
tong, tong" is also the sound of the kentongan, the signal-drum which, 
depending on the number of beats and the rhythm, can be used for c a l l ­
ing meetings, giving the time, or warning of f i r e , th eft , or other 
emergencies. It  is quite possible that in some cases the thief was 
paraded to the sound of the "th ie f  kentongan," broadcasting loudly 
that "here we have caught a t h ie f ! "
Here is another eyewitness account of a dombrfeng action , this 
time in the kecamatan of Ulujami. It was a Wednesday in October and 
the kecamatan1s eighteen lurah had assembled for a meeting at about 
10 a.m . Then a parade (arak2an ) coming in from the east approached 
the kecamatan o ffic e . Soenarjo, a member of the prewar pegerakan and 
secretary of the Ulujami Indonesian National Committee, who was at the 
meeting, describes the scene thus:
The crowd of people all had bamboo spears and were accompanied by 
banging on empty kerosene tins, "brSng dong br§ng." When the crowd 
got closer, it appeared that the lurah of Rowosari, Muhadi, was in 
the middle. His face was smeared with lamp soot and he was wearing 
a necklace of paddy. The parade almost dropped in at the kecamatan, 
but for whatever reason this didn’t happen. This put all the lurah 
into a great panic, the conference ended in confusion, and they hur­
riedly returned to their respective villages.60
A typical dombrgng action usually followed this scenario: A
crowd, mostly "tung dung brung-ers, " 6 1 arrives at the house of the
59Singgih Harsojo's version is that he was wounded in the face by a bamboo 
spear as he went to the aid of the kecamatan secretary, who was being overwhelmed by 
the crowd. His account does not mention the thief ruse, though other versions do. 
Interviews in November 1971.
6°Interview in November 1975.
61In Pemalang, calling someone a "tung dung brung-er" means saying he is 
ikut2an, not actually an opportunist, but a "mindless follower" who comes running to 
see what all the fuss is about whenever he hears the sound of the signal drum.
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person who is to be dombr§ng-ed. They break into the person’ s house.
If  the person is found, he is taken out, presented to the crowd and 
paraded around, often with a necklace of hulled rice or paddy, to the 
"brSng dong br§ng" of empty tins and sticks being beaten. This always 
occurs during the day so that the maximum number of people can see the 
Mcorrupter,M and he w ill be as humiliated as possible . The essence, 
then, of these dombrdng actions was a symbolic, public unmasking and 
shaming of o ffic ia ls  rather than intimidating or k illin g  them. But it 
was not only o ffic ia ls  who were unmasked. In Temuireng village  on the 
coast, for example, a man was dombrdng-ed for having intercourse with 
his stepdaughter. In Sirangkang, in the same area, a pemuda was caught 
gambling. The cards were made into a necklace and he was paraded 
around the v illage  by Pesindo.
From Moga, the chain of popular actions against hated o ffic ia ls  
spread north, and south to the h ill  d istrict  of Belik . Mostly, the 
demand was that paddy be distributed . Hardjowinoto, the wedana of 
Belik , had gone to a meeting in the village of Bulakan. He tells  what 
happened as follows:
I entered the yard on horseback and saw the sharpened bamboo spears 
hidden in the fence. That made me feel rather frightened, but I 
went on, dismounted, and met the crowd. They were all asking for 
the paddy which they had been forced to sell to the government. I 
told them, "It doesn’t belong to me. I cannot give you the paddy 
without an order from my superiors. I am only an ordinary official."
So I told them, if they didn’t want to wait for an order, to go 
ahead and distribute the paddy, but that it was their decision, not 
mine. They formed a committee and I advised them not to have any 
village officials [junjang krawat] on it .62
The position  taken by the wedana of Belik to "w ait for orders" 
from above was common to all pangrdh praja of Pekalongan Residency 
during September and October 1945 and reflected the tim idity , lack of 
in it ia t iv e , and obsequiousness fostered by their Dutch bureaucratic 
training and feudal backgrounds. Surviving local perjuangan leaders 
are convinced that one of the reasons for the revolusi sosial was the 
failure  of the central and provincial governments to inform local 
pangrSh praja about the policies  of Jakarta or about the guarantees of 
cooperation their own spokesmen had given to Sukarno in September.
Left on their own, not knowing what the government wanted them to do 
( e .g . ,  d istribute  the paddy or n o t ), they reacted in the only way they 
knew, by waiting for orders from above.
The wedana of Belik later met a larger, d ifferent crowd of some 
hundreds on its way to the central paddy storage place in Belik . Tak­
ing a back route to Belik to get there before the crowd arrived, he 
remembers what happened as follows:
In every village you could hear the sound of the kentongan titir, 
the most urgent signal—a ceaseless, fast; even beat warning of
62Transcript of taped interview in May 1973. (The term junjang krawat is used 
only in certain areas away from the central courts of Yogya and Solo to refer to 
punggawa desa or village officials. W. J. S. Poerwadarminta, Baoesastra Djawa 
[Jakarta: Wolters, 1939], p. 96.)
Ill
danger. The lurah accompanying me wanted to go home. He was afraid 
for the safety of his family. Then a former member of the Keibddan 
showed me the quickest way back to the kewedanaan. It seemed every­
one had left. Someone met me saying it was too dangerous to return, 
but I wasn’t anxious. What happens is preordained [takdir] anyway.
. . . As I got nearer someone called out "Merdeka!" I was relieved; 
that meant I still had some authority.63
The greeting "Merdeka" that the wedana received from the people 
was a greeting of friendship , not enmity. He was not one of the pan- 
grSh praja believed to have bought rice up cheaply during the occupa­
tion, or to have traded illegally  in fish  confiscated on its way up 
through Belik to Banyumas. At least one person was prepared to defend 
him physically :
A Chinese stepped forward out of the crowd. I recognized him, he 
had come to me for help during the Japanese time, as the camat was 
forcing him to pay Rp. 150 as a Foreigner’s Registration Fee or be 
sent off as a forced laborer [rdmusha]. I had told him then to say, 
if asked, that he had paid me the money, as I knew the camat wouldn’t 
dare check up. The Chinese said that if anyone dared come near me, 
he would stab them himself.6Z*
In the three southernmost kecamatan--Belik, Watukumpul, and Pulo- 
sari--the mildness of the social revolution is apparent. Fewer lurah 
were replaced than along the coast. Although these areas had been e x ­
tremely poor since Dutch times (it  w ill be remembered that the Mardi 
Utomo was formed in and for P u lo s a r i) , the santri oppositional element 
was m issing. Being very poor abangan, the villagers could neither 
afford nor were as keen to send their sons away to traditional Muslim 
schools (pesantr£n), as peasants did in Moga and Randudongkal. Not only 
were there no santri leaders from the pergerakan, such as Kyai Said in 
Gendoang, there were also no lenggaong villages in these subdistricts .
In the town of Pemalang, the social revolution was characterized 
by a night of upheaval in which the houses of a lurah and the camat of 
Pemalang were set on f ir e , and many others looted. The actions were 
sparked off by the lynching of Djoewito, a former agricultural officer  
who had been responsible for the distribution  of cloth during the occu­
pation . Djoewito had been having a meal at the market, not knowing 
that a crowd was waiting for him outside. As he left the market on 
his bicycle he was stopped and k illed  with a hammer blow on the h e a d .65
That night crowds roamed the streets of Pemalang looking for 
"corrupt o n e s ."  In the words of an API leader: "The people were
parading around wearing only shorts or loin cloths [cawat] , their bod­
ies blackened with lamp soot. They wore old tires around their necks 
which were taken off and cut up to make torches, so they could see 
their w a y ."66 About 10 p .m ., a mob arrived at the kabupat&n, but found
63Ibid. 64Ibid.
65From interviews (all secondhand accounts) in Pemalang in February and Novem­
ber 1975. I have no eyewitness account of Djoewitofs death.
66Interview with a former leader of API in February 1975.
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no one home; a pemuda leader had persuaded the bupati to lie  lo w .67 
The crowd then went to the house of the kabupat&n secretary, which was 
broken into and ransacked.
Other leading priyayi o ffic ia ls  known to be corrupt were singled 
out that night. For example, the house of the wedana of Pemalang, 
Wijogo Puspojudo, Mwho coughed continuously and had a young second 
w i f e ,"  was sacked. The home of Wadri, the head of the Fisheries De­
partment, met the same fate . One Pemalang priyay i, who was in the 
perjuangan, remembers: "Wadri! That bajingan tengik [rotten-smelling
petty th ie f]! He married the b up ati's  sister-in-law, a widow, so that 
he could say, ’ I'm  married into the b upati's  f a m il y .1 I was riding a 
bike with solid  rubber t ires , while he was hoarding tubes--he had a 
whole room f u l l ! " 68
At least one pangr&h praja from the rural areas was in Pemalang 
on that n ight, having earlier been the target of similar action in his 
own locality . The ex-camat remembers:
We had left all our belongings behind in Bodeh, had arrived in Pema­
lang, and were staying in the house of a teacher named Umar. We had 
just finished dinner about 7 p.m. when a crowd came past the front 
of the house and stopped. Small children were carrying petromax 
lamps and small red and white flags, and beating on empty cans,
"tong tong tong." Then I remembered that Umar had been a kumichb 
and responsible for the distribution system of his neighborhood asso­
ciation. The mob surrounded his house and tried to enter it, shout­
ing, MBurn! Burn!" We managed to move ourselves and our belongings 
to the house of the next-door neighbor, Kyai Abdullah. Someone said,
" I t ’s not the house but the man that we want." Then Umar's house 
was ransacked and we lost our bicycle and all the belongings that we 
had brought from Bodeh. Apparently, Pak Umar knew what was going to 
happen as he had moved his sewing machine and other goods before­
hand.69
N atsir , the Pemalang police c h ie f , was among those whom the town's 
pemuda kidnapped that same night for their own safety . Here is his 
w ife 's  account:
During the night he got up and went out to relieve himself, dressed 
only in a sarong and a singlet, and didn't come back. I hurried to 
the police barracks, but he wasn't there. Then I went to the pemuda 
headquarters and was told he was in the jail. I was allowed to see 
him. He said he had been held up by a man with a pistol. The next 
day about ten pemuda came to our house. They took all the Dutch 
books from the shelves, carried them outside and made a bonfire of
67A leader of GPAI recalls: "I found the bupati in the langgar [small Muslim
house of worship] near my house. I asked him, 'What are you doing here, sir?' He 
replied, 'I 'l l  just stay here for a while. There won't be any problem.' Then I 
talked to an Arab called Ali and found out that the kabupaten had been attacked and 
the patih's house set on fire."
68Interview in February 1975.
69Interview with former camat of Bodeh in September 1971.
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them, saying this was evidence Pak Natsir had been a NICA [Nether- 
lands Indies Civil Administration] agent. They said it wasn't safe 
for me there and that they would take me to Msafety.M70
Mrs. Natsir and the wives and fam ilies of all the town's top pri- 
yayi o ffic ia ls  were taken to the former residence of the Japanese 
shidokan on the north side of the town square. A perjuangan leader 
today claims that only those fam ilies who were w illing  were moved to 
safety at the shidokanfs house. The bup ati's  w ife , however, was among 
those who considered themselves interned:
I took the kabupaten heirloom with me, a small kris called Bah Tapah.
Every night it was washed, the water was kept overnight in a refrig­
erator and the next day sent in three thermoses to the prison. One 
was for the guards, so that after drinking they would not be too 
harsh towards the prisoners; the rest was to give my husband peace 
of mind while he was in prison.70 1
Haji Bushaeri, the Hizbullah leader, remembers that f,all the o f f i ­
cials  accused of being corrupt were rounded up, had their hands tied 
above their heads, and were taken to the tennis court in the town 
s q u a r e ."72 Between sixteen and eighteen of the town's o ffic ia ls  were 
put in j a i l ,  the only place where their physical safety could be guaran­
teed. They included the bupati; Soemarto, the patih ; N atsir , the police 
ch ief; Wijogo Puspojudo, the wedana of Pemalang; Sukardis, the head of 
the Public Works Department; Wadri, the head of the Fisheries Depart­
ment; "Meneer" Umar, the teacher and kumicho; and Raden Soewignyo, the 
kabupaten secretary. Abdul Mutholib, whose name was at the top of the 
pemuda b la c k list , was able to make a dramatic but temporary escape with 
the help of a pemuda who, although a member of A PI, also belonged to 
Muhammadiyah and was M utholib's neighbor. Mutholib had gone into h id ­
ing earlier  in the day at the camat's house but had later been moved 
(lu c k ily , for his sake) to this pemuda's house. The latter recalls :
The pemuda said, "Whoever is hiding Mutholib will be killed." When 
the disturbances had died down, we left by bicycle at about 2 a.m. 
with Mutholib on the back. He was very nervous and very scared.
"Hidup mati ditangan dik Ali [My life is in your hands, little 
brother Ali]," he said. He was on the back because he was so fright­
ened that he reckoned his legs were too weak to pedal, although he 
weighed between 95 and 100 kilograms while I was much lighter, and 
he should really have been carrying me! At Bojongbata [south of 
Pemalang] we were stopped by the village secretary, Denin. Luckily 
he knew my voice. I said that Mutholib was my older brother. We 
finally arrived at the small station of Babatan, having ridden the 
seven kilometers in about an hour.73
Later that morning Mutholib boarded the train to Tegal, but on the way 
he was recognized by some Arab pemuda and taken back to Pemalang.
There he was handed over to the GPAI markas and ended up on the tennis- 
court with all the other prisoners. This is the place perhaps to point
70Interview with Mrs. Natsir in September 1972.
71Interview with Mrs. Rahardjo in December 1971.
72Interview in November 1975. 73Interview in February 1975.
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out that Pemalang was unique in the Residency in that santri pemuda 
from both the GPAI and Hizbullah played a major role in the early part 
of the social revolution. As the pemuda deputy leader of Hizbullah at 
the time put it later:
The main purpose [of the pemuda], including the religious group, was 
to oppose the corrupt ones, ’’Meneer” Umar, Wadri, and their crowd.
Ideology was not important then, nobody thought about ideology, at 
least the Islamic group didn’t. There were no orders, that is why 
semangat and spontaneity were so important. Someone would point 
their thumb in the direction of the next house. Everyone would 
understand and head for that house. At that time, like no other 
period during the revolution, we were together, we were one. We 
also didn’t know anything about politics [buta politik] in those 
days. Certainly, the Islamic group was. Most of the leaders of the 
pemuda brigade were santri. We were united then with the one aim of 
destroying the corruptor cliques.74
The next morning a mass meeting was held in the town square, where 
Soepangat spoke. He told the people that there must not be any more 
arson and that no one should be k ille d . The fact that Soepangat’ s call 
for order was obeyed highlights an important difference between the 
social revolutionary movement in Pemalang and its counterparts in Tegal 
and Brebes.
While the latter two movements were fragmented in several ways, 
Soepangat was able to forge a remarkable unity between his own group 
of prewar secular nationalists , younger pemuda figures , and the santri 
leaders. He had begun this work in the Pekope and was to continue it 
until the end of the Tiga Daerah A ffa ir . The relative absence of v io ­
lence in Pemalang, however, was also due to the fact that the rural 
lenggaong in general followed Soepangat*s leadership , and as for urban 
thieves (pencoleng) and troublemakers (tukang tetek-beng£k) ,  Soepangat 
controlled them through a well-known pencoleng called Madrei, who was 
imported specially  for that purpose from Randudongkal. A former leader 
of A P I ’ s Markas IV recalls : ’’The remarkable thing about the period of
Soepangat’ s rule in Pemalang was that there were literally  no thieves, 
pickpockets, or troublemakers operating in the town. They all followed 
Soepangat*s le ad e rsh ip .” 75 The former leader of the Laskar Pemuda 
Tionghoa attributed Soepangat’ s success to his reputation for honesty 
and fairness in running the Pekope rationing system. He was also well 
liked by everyone because of his tactful f le x ib il ity  (kasupelan ) , and 
he was closer to the pemuda than many pemuda leaders themselves.
Let us now turn to the subdistricts to the east of Pemalang, and 
look b riefly  in turn at what was happening at the kecamatan level in 
Petarukan and Taman, and at the village level in Bumirejo and Ambowetan 
(Uluj a m i).
In Petarukan the sugar factory was taken over by S id r is , a famous 
lenggaong and leader of the Barisan C§ngkrong (Sickle C orp s). This 
band of brigands (jago ) used to ride about on bicycles with long
74Interview in February 1975. 75Interview in February 1975.
115
sick les , carrying out actions against many lu r a h .76 After Sidris was 
appointed factory administrator the camat went into h iding , for fear 
of him; several days after the factory had been taken over, a new camat 
was appointed. The former secretary of a local Pesindo branch de­
scribes what happened:
Thousands of people had gathered at the Petarukan soccer field. The 
local school teacher Soedaju had been "carried" [digandeng] to the 
field from his house. Sidris held up a sickle in his hand and an­
nounced, "I am now the sugar factory administrator [besar pabrik].
I announce that [Soe]Daju is appointed Assistant Wedana." Tears 
were trickling down Soedajufs face. Then the old assistant factory 
head Ismail ceremoniously handed over the factory samurai sword.
Ilham, a local leader of the prewar pergerakan, was elected as police 
agent [mantri polisi], and Sidris's brother as head of the subdis­
trict office. Ilham then said that any other officials would be 
appointed when needed.77
Meanwhile, the old camat Soejatno had managed to get a letter to Soe- 
pangat's  w ife , a distant relative , explaining his p ligh t . In the town 
of Pemalang the perjuangan leaders thought that he had been k ille d . 
However, he eventually managed to escape from Petarukan with the Ken- 
dalsari Pesindo secretary:
I left at 1 a.m. with Soejatno on the back of my bicycle. I was 
armed only with a chain used in kuntau silat [self-defense art].78 
Raden Parno was with me and he had a keris pedut; he kept one hand 
on the handlebars and one hand on the kris (it was a special kris 
which made you invisible). At 3 a.m. we arrived in Banjardowo. We 
were stopped by Li Cing, a follower of the main leader of the perju­
angan there, but were allowed to go on (this was because of the 
power of the kris). We arrived at the house of the new patih, Dr.
Muriawan, but the Pesindo guards didnft seem to notice us, and we 
weren't challenged, so we went to the back door and knocked. Dr.
Muriawan opened it with his left hand. In his right hand he held a 
pistol. He embraced Soejatno, saying, "We heard that you had been 
killed."79
Soejatno went into hiding for several weeks in Dr. Muriawan?s house 
and was then appointed as kabupatSn secretary. Here again Soepangat 
demonstrated his authority and s k il l . It was not popular to use o f f i ­
cials of the pangr&h praja , but Soepangat believed it was necessary to 
keep the wheels of government moving, and he had the authority to make 
his view stick . It is interesting that the ousted camat of Ampelgading 
was also employed in the new kabupatdn adm inistration. In reply to 
the cry of the more radical element in the town’ s perjuangan (the
760n the role of the jago in the rural revolution in West Java, see John R. W. 
Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution3 1945-1946 9 Cornell Modern Indonesia Project 
Monograph Series (Ithaca, 1964), pp. 123-25.
77Interview in November 1975.
7QKuntau is a combination of two Hokkien words: kun9 meaning "hand," and tau>
"blow." Kuntau silat means a particular type of self-defense art (silat) using the 
hands.
79Interview in November 1975.
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ex-Digul-SR group) who said, "D o n ’ t leave a single stooge of the Japa­
nese i n , "  Soepangat and Dr. Muriawan urged, "Let us use the ones who 
are honest [yang baik digakai s a ja ] . "  Not having any formal adm inis­
trative sk ills  themselves, they felt forced to rely on at least two 
former camat, one of whom seems to have been strongly implicated in 
the corruption of the Japanese period.
Gunodo Surio , the camat of Taman, the subdistrict between Petaru- 
kan and Pemalang to the east, was the only camat in the entire kabu- 
pat&n who "escaped" the revolusi sosial--but not because he was not 
considered "upper c la s s ."  As the son of R. A . A. Soerio, the bupati 
of Pekalongan, his aristocratic credentials were impeccable. He was 
in fact the most well-born of all the camat in Pemalang. He was saved 
because he was not considered corrupt. In fact , he had worked to a l l e ­
viate the sufferings of the people in Taman during the Japanese occupa­
tion by appointing an honest committee to organize the rationing , and 
by using the kecamatan cloth quota to make pairs of shorts and sarongs 
to be distributed  to those too poor to get cloth by delivering paddy. 
Secondly, he had a close relationship with the santri leaders in Taman, 
and had asked them to give out rice to the local pemuda after the 
Proclam ation.80
At the d istrict  and subdistrict level in other areas the in s ta lla ­
tion of new o ffic ia ls  was not as dramatic as the expression of popular 
sovereignty that occurred in Petarukan. In areas where there had been 
few dombrdng actions, i f  any, the Pemalang perjuangan leadership was 
s t ill  anxious that the people be given the chance to choose new local 
o ffic ia ls  if  they wished. The old wedana of Belik  takes up the story 
in his inim itable style:
Soepangat (I called him Mas Pangat) told me that he had been chosen 
as bupati. Ha, good luck to him! He said that perhaps the kaweda- 
naan of Belik wanted an election, and could I call a meeting? I 
said yes, certainly I could. Then Pangat came and told the meeting 
that he had been chosen as the new bupati of Pemalang. "I am now 
the bupati of Pemalang, and I was chosen by the people. I have come 
here because I want to give all the people the same chance. If you 
donft like your present wedana, you can choose a new one, I will 
organize it ."  But the people said: "No, we will keep our present
wedana." Then I told the meeting that this was a great chance for 
them, that there had never ever been a wedana elected by popular 
choice since the early times. I told them this was their chance to 
choose someone they wanted. They should not be shy [jangan malu];
if they didn’t want to choose me because I wasn’t a local per­
son, I would return home. The camat, trying to encourage the people, 
said the old wedana had had to be called master [ndoro] but the we­
dana who were chosen by the people could be called father [£>apak].81
As the wedana was by himself in isolated Belik , Soepangat offered him 
a revolver, but the latter declined. " I  told him [Soepangat] that if
I was given a revolver my behavior might change. Then people who d id n ’ t
like me might say, ’What is the use of one revolver against all of u s ? ’ 
So I wouldn’ t take i t . "
80Interviews with Gunodo Surio in December 1971 and a santri leader in Taman 
in November 1975.
81Transcript of taped interview in May 1973.
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Let us now look b riefly  at the revolusi sosial in two villages in 
Ulujami to highlight the respective roles played by members of the pre­
war pergerakan, the lenggaong element and the santri leaders.
The day after the first  dombrdng action had been witnessed by the 
lurah of Ulujami subdistrict at their meeting in the kecamatan (see 
above, p. 1 0 9 ) , an orderly crowd of about 200 unarmed people arrived 
at the kalurahan of Bumirejo. By this time the lurah and the other 
v illage  o ffic ia ls  had already gone into hiding . The leader of the 
crowd, a certain Daris from the prewar pergerakan, announced their de­
mand that the lurah and his staff  be dismissed because they had helped 
the Japanese. A set of new o ffic ia ls  was then appointed, headed by a 
new lurah, Rasid, who was a former Sarekat Rakyat school teacher and a 
veteran of the pergerakan. This new v illage  administration did not 
last long, however, because it did not reflect the strength of the 
lenggaong element in Bumirejo. Two days later, the list  of o ffic ia ls  
was changed again to include the son of Siwad, the lenggaong leader, 
as secretary .82 This second peaceful reshuffle , presided over by the 
chairman of the Ulujami KNI, reflected the ambitions of Siwad and the 
other lenggaong from Bumirejo Kidul who wanted Siwad to be lurah.
There were several factors contributing to the orderliness of the 
revolusi sosial in Bumirejo. F irst , during the occupation, there had 
apparently been no paddy searches, and so popular anger was not as 
high as in other places. Second, there was a strong prewar pergerakan 
core leadership which could quickly respond to local demands. Thus 
the crowds which assembled came without bamboo spears, carried out no 
dombrSng actions, and did not burn or ransack o f f i c ia l s 1 houses. That 
Siwad was unable to oust the new lurah Rasid was partly because Soe- 
narjo , the secretary of the Ulujami KNI and a veteran of 1926 and the 
SR, was R asid 's  b ro th er .83
In Ambowetan events followed a very different course. Containing 
a large santri group and no members of the prewar pergerakan, the v i l ­
lage had suffered harshly during the Japanese times; as a result, the 
social revolution was a much fiercer a ffa ir  than in Bumirejo. The 
lurah !s house was ransacked by about one hundred people repeatedly 
shouting, f,Where is the lurah Sayan? [Dimana lurah Sa ya n?] ."  His 
clothes were taken, and 200 quintals of paddy were distributed , about 
20 quintals remaining from the noji and the rest belonging to the 
lurah him self. Each household received between 40 and 70 kilograms.
The crowd was led by a santri called Bunyamin, who had the largest 
popular following in the v illag e ; Kastam, the lenggaong; and Darum, 
son-in-law of a former lurah and father-in-law of Kastam. The old 
village policeman Wariad, who had been an azacho in the Japanese time, 
was chased out and fled  to the Dieng plateau. Dajani, the bau desa>Qt*
82Siwad himself had been made secretary during the Dutch time in the hope of 
inducing him to stop his lenggaong activities.
83Interview with Soenarjo; see also his memoir, "Peristiwa 'Tiga Daerah1 di 
kecamatan Ulujami" (typescript).
et*k bau desa is a hamlet head, called kamitua in south-central Java.
Table 1. Changes in Village Heads in Pemalang KabupatSn during the Revolusi Sosial of October 1945 


















Comal 17 13 - 4 4 1 3 1 uncertain
Moga 18 13




2 7 2 1 1 5 uncertain
Source: Interviews in three subdistricts in February and November 1975.
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was wounded in the head and dombrSng-ed in tears around the village .
The old carik Awal lost a set of tables and chairs, 5 quintals of 
paddy, and 15 kilograms of hulled r ice , while the walls of his house 
were left  full of holes from bamboo spears. The no ji ,  a former lu.rah 
of Ambowetan, had supernatural powers and a special kris, which enabled 
him to ward off an attack from Bunyamin wielding a rice-pounder. But 
his powers did not prevent 25 quintals of rice from being taken, which 
he admits today he had embezzled during the occupation. He also lost 
40 goats, but these were later returned because they were not obtained 
by corrupt m eans.85
In the new village administration, Kastam the lenggaong became 
lurah, and the other positions were f i l led  by members of the lenggaong 
group, with the exception of two santri followers of Bunyamin. By con­
trast to Bumirejo, there was no meeting in which the kecamatan KNI 
leaders supervised the installation  of the new village government.
In some places where different revolutionary factions could not 
agree, the village sp lit ,  electing two new lurah. This might have 
been the outcome in Bumirejo, had the Ulujami kecamatan KNI not stepped 
in when, after two days, it appeared that Bumirejo Kidul was not s a t is ­
fied  with the first  Mpopularff village government. In Pesucen, in Peta- 
rukan subdistrict , where there were fewer active local KNI or members 
of the prewar pergerakan supervising the choice of village  heads, and 
the lenggaong element was much stronger, the village ended up split in 
two. The old administration fell  when a crowd led by the lenggaong 
Ali Warto and three henchmen ransacked and burned the houses of five 
village o f f ic ia ls .  At a meeting then held in the local school, Ali 
Warto was acclaimed as the new lurah. But he could not hold the whole 
village  under his authority. Part of it split off to form a new v i l ­
lage called Selumbu, whose lurah was the former bau of Pesucen. The 
tanah bgngkok was divided evenly between the two new kalurahan. (Ali 
Warto promptly sold all his newly acquired surplus paddy and gambled 
the proceeds away at cards.)
Some of the patterns evident in Pemalang's revolusi sosial can be 
seen in Table 1, which details changes in village  administration in 
the three subdistricts of Ulujami, Comal, and Moga. The most violent 
upheavals occurred in Ulujami, where only one lurah, a santri called 
Haji Sukur, survived in o ffice . (Even he barely withstood a "coup" 
organized by the lenggaong Deman.) In both Comal and Moga the changes 
were less drastic , but st ill  extensive. At the same time it is notable 
that in "v io le n t1' Ulujami more of the new lurah came from the ranks of 
village officialdom than was the case in Moga or Comal. The strong 
santri element may account for the changes in Moga, for many of the 
new lurah there were local Muslim leaders.
It is instructive that those new lurah in Ulujami who were santri 
all had their status legitimized by the new bupati of Pemalang, Haji 
Makmur, after the Tiga Daerah A ffair  was over. This confirmation of 
santri social revolutionaries in office  was typical, in fact , of admin­
istration in the Residency. Perhaps more surprisingly , three of the 
four new lenggaong lurah in Ulujami survived in o ffice . And in Bumi­
rejo the lenggaong Siwad was able to attain the coveted lurahship when
85Interview with the former lurah of Ambowetan in October 1975.
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Rasid was arrested by the army during the government’ s December 1945 
crackdown on the revolusi sosial.
What all this suggests is that hated established administrators 
were overthrown almost everywhere. But succession passed to a variety 
of (and often combination between) counter-elites and pergerakan vet­
erans .
The Aftermath
The social revolutionary governments in Pemalang, Brebes, and 
Tegal continued until early December 1945, when they chose Sardjijo  as 
the new "revolutionary11 Resident. At a meeting in the Pemalang kabu- 
patdn building on December 9, he was accepted by representatives from 
the Pekalongan perjuangan. (It  w ill  be remembered that Soepangat had 
already been formally installed as bupati of Pemalang, while Mr. Besar 
was s t i ll  Resident.)  At that point, the army and the central govern­
ment moved to intervene decisively . On December 12, the army, aided 
by Muslims coming mainly from Pekajangan, south of Pekalongan, attacked. 
There was l ittle  resistance anywhere. In Comal, the troops had a brief  
clash with local pemuda, and at the Banjardowo sugar factory the 
Pesindo leader Muharib was k illed . At 11 a.m. on Thursday, December 
2 0 , 86 the military entered the town of Pemalang its e lf .  The local 
perjuangan leaders were immediately rounded up and taken to the town 
square. One perjuangan leader from Bojongbata, south of Pemalang, 
r e c a lls :
I had just begun my afternoon sleep, when a member of the TKR [Army] 
arrived. I was told to get up, my hands were tied, then I was beaten 
in my house; then I was told to run, while I was beaten with a sword 
handle from behind. I had to run two kilometers to the Pemalang 
police headquarters, where I was beaten again in my cell. There I 
stayed for five days. Then I was moved to Pemalang jail, which was 
full up, and there I stayed for a year.87
Other arrests followed, on a fairly  massive scale. A former ja iler  
relates that "People were being taught a lesson [d ih a jar ] by the TKR. 
They were lined up in the town square and whipped until they were half 
dead. People were screaming, ’ Tolong! Tolongl [ H e l p ! ] . 1 The ja i l  was 
right on the square, so I could see what was going o n . " 88 Ten days 
later, on December 30 , the townfs leading santri, Kyai Makmur, was 
elected bupati, while Soepangat and his associates were in ja il  in 
Pekalongan.89 Soepangat himself was released in January 1947, but 
Amir, Tan Djing Kwan, and four others were finally  brought to trial in 
Pekalongan in March 1947, charged with making a coup (makar) or a t ­
tempting to change the structure of the government by force. All were 
released shortly before the first  Dutch police action in July 1947.
86Diary of Salim Bassiyul. 87Interview in February 1975.
88Interview in February 1975.
89Soepangat escaped south to the Residency of Banyuma^ when the TKR entered 
Pemalang, and joined President Sukarno’s entourage then touring Central Java. Arriv­
ing in Pekalongan with the official party on December 24, he was recognized by the 
TKR and local Muslim leaders, dragged out of the reception during Sukarno’s speech, 
and imprisoned along with the other leaders of the revolusi sosial.
Conclusion
The immediate background to the social revolution in Pemalang can 
be seen in the Japanese occupation, with the buildup of tension between 
the pangrSh praja and the people, especially in the rural areas. The 
former were for the first  time forced to play decisive economic roles 
as the military administration attempted to mobilize Java 's  resources 
for the war effort . Rather than trying to soften the harsh impact of 
Japanese p o lic ies , many, indeed probably most, exacerbated it by cor­
ruption and extortion. After the Proclamation, the central, provin­
c ia l ,  and even the residency governments were too weak and too preoccu­
pied to give support and guidance to the pangr^h praja . These o ffic ia ls  
took no action to alleviate the severe suffering in the rural areas, 
waiting inertly for orders that never came.
The beginning of the revolusi sosial was characterized by a spe­
cial type of social protest known as dombrSng actions. These actions 
were basically  spontaneous expressions of long-suppressed anger against 
particular exploitative o f f ic ia ls .  The one camat to survive in his 
position did so because he had tried with some success to alleviate  
cruel social conditions during the Japanese occupation.
In some areas the revolusi sosial showed sim ilarities  to tr a d i­
tional rural movements in Java, with either the religious leaders or 
bandit chiefs playing active roles. Yet the general cry "Merdeka!" 
was part of a modern Indonesian revolutionary ideology, and the revo­
lutionary pemuda, with their slogans and plays, were quite new to 
Pemalang l i f e .
But the social revolutionary o ff ic ia ls  who were swept to power in 
the wake of the dombr^ng actions were unable to achieve much in their 
attempts to bring about lasting and real social change. The central 
government gave no support, indeed became actively antagonistic. Peka- 
longan's in it ia l  suspicion turned to open hostility  when Sardjijo  took 
over as Resident in December. And, in addition, there was no local 
social revolutionary armed force which could resist the TKR when it 
decided to crush the Tiga Daerah movement. (Sardjijo  was only Resident 
for three and a half days before being jailed  by the m ilitary .)
One abiding result of the revolusi sosial , however, was the re ­
moval of many of the old village elite  of the colonial era and their 
replacement by religious elites nationalist leaders, or lenggaong. 
Subdistrict and district  chiefs were genuinely elected by the people 
for the first  time ever. While these changes in Pemalang represented 
a real transfer of political  power, they remained changes at the local 
level: most of the pangr&h praja driven out of Pemalang at the height 
of the revolusi sosial were given comparable appointments in other 
residencies by the central government.
One interesting feature of the revolusi sosial is the evident 
continuity with the disturbances of 1926. Many veterans of 1926 
assumed leadership positions in the pemuda-manned badan perjuangan; 
others became lurah or other village o ff ic ia ls  after the wave of dom- 
br§ng actions. As in 1926, the main lines of conflict were not between 
aliran  and aliran , but rather between classes and between rival e lites .
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Perhaps the strongest and strangest impression of those involved 
at the time, however, is the unity that was felt  among all members of 
the perjuangan, whether Islamic- or Dutch-educated, pemuda or national­
ist veteran. This impression is especially vivid  today, because such 
unity was never again achieved in Pemalang either during the revolu­
tion or since.
